T he suicide attempt (SA) rate among US Army soldiers increased substantially during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 1 Medically documented SAs are more likely to occur among soldiers never or previously deployed (vs currently deployed) and soldiers who are female, younger, nonHispanic white, less educated, and in the early stages of army service, particularly the initial months of training.
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The risk of SA may also be influenced by events within a soldier's army unit, including suicidal behavior of other unit members. Units are the foundational structure of the US Army. Soldiers have a variety of shared unit experiences, including exposure to external group stressors (eg, training, deployment, and combat) and internal group stressors (eg, leadership changes, bullying by peers or leaders, and injury or death of unit members). External group stressors, particularly combat, adversely affect the mental health and suicide risk of soldiers within a unit. [4] [5] [6] Internal unit characteristics, including leadership quality and group cohesion, can exacerbate or mitigate the influence of external group stressors on performance and health-related outcomes, 7-10 including suicide ideation.
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Injuries and deaths from combat and unintentional events become internal group stressors that adversely affect the mental and physical health of unit members. [12] [13] [14] Less is known about the influence of suicidal behavior on other unit members. Personal accounts suggest that suicidal events can have profound negative effects within a unit. 15 Suicide contagion, in which exposure to suicide is proposed to increase suicidal behaviors in others, even if the person who died was not personally known, 16 may result in clustering or multiple suicidal behaviors exhibited in a short period and/or specific geographic area or community. 17, 18 Multiple suicidal events may also reflect high unit stress attributable to factors such as poor leadership or low group cohesion. To the extent that there is an association between previous SAs within a unit and subsequent SA risk among soldiers in that unit, the strength of that association may be modified by individual and unit characteristics. Military occupation influences suicide risk, with combat soldiers having significantly elevated rates of suicide death compared with other soldiers. 19 It is not known whether this increased risk is associated with the number of previous unit suicides or SAs. Unit size is another potentially relevant characteristic. Small military units, with their shared culture, structure, and cohesion, may profoundly affect soldiers' functioning and well-being. 20 It is possible that previous SAs within smaller units have a greater influence on subsequent risk among unit members. We examined whether a soldier's risk of SA is influenced by previous SAs in that soldier's unit after adjusting for individual sociodemographic and service-related characteristics, history of mental health diagnosis, and other internal unit stressors, including previous unit deaths from combat, unintentional injuries, and suicide. We also examined whether the influence of previous unit SAs varies by occupation and unit size.
Methods

Sample
This longitudinal, retrospective cohort study used data from the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (STARRS) Historical Administrative Data Study (HADS), which integrates 38 US Army and US Department of Defense administrative data systems and includes individual-level person-month records for all soldiers on active duty from January 1, 2004 , through December 31, 2009 
Previous Mental Health Diagnosis
We created an indicator variable for any previous mental health diagnosis during army service by combining ICD-9-CM codes from administrative medical records (eg, major depression, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders), excluding postconcussion syndrome, tobacco use disorder, and supplemental V codes that are not disorders (eg, stressors or adversities, marital problems) (eTable 3 in the Supplement).
Unit Variables
Unit-related variables for each soldier were constructed from administrative records. Duty units were determined using deidentified Unit Identification Codes. Soldiers with the same Unit Identification Code in a given calendar month were considered to be members of the same unit (eAppendix in the Supplement).
Unit SAs in the Past Year
We constructed a total count of SAs occurring in each soldier's unit during the year before the sampled person-month record. This count excluded SAs made by case soldiers. The resulting predictor variable was interpreted from the sampled soldier's perspective (ie, number of SAs in "my" duty unit during the past year). The same method was used to obtain counts of past-year unit suicide, combat, and unintentional deaths.
Unit Size
The size of a soldier's army unit was determined based on the mean number of soldiers in that unit during the past 3 months (including the sampled person-month). For instance, the size of a given soldier's unit in March 2009 was obtained by averaging the number of soldiers in that unit in January, February, and March 2009. Unit sizes (1-40, 41-100, 101-200, and 201-600 soldiers) were categorized to approximate army operational units.
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Statistical Analysis
Analyses were conducted using SAS statistical software, version 9.4. 26 The association of past-year unit SAs with SA risk was first examined in a univariable logistic regression analysis, followed by a series of multivariable logistic regression analyses, adjusting for sociodemographic variables (sex, current age, race/ethnicity, educational level, and marital status), service-related characteristics (age at army entry, time in service, deployment status, and occupation), prior mental health diagnosis, and other unit variables (unit size, suicide deaths, combat deaths, and unintentional deaths). We then separately examined the interaction of unit SAs with occupation and unit size to determine whether the association of unit SAs with subsequent SA risk varied according to these characteristics. These interactions were further explored by stratifying the sample. Logistic regression coefficients were exponentiated to obtain odds ratios (ORs) and 95% CIs. Final model coefficients were used to generate a standardized risk estimate 27 (SRE; number of suicide attempters per 100 000 person-years) for each category of a predictor under a model that assumed other predictors were at their sample-wide means.
All logistic regression models included a dummy predictor for calendar month and year to control for increasing rates of SA from 2004 through 2009. 1 Coefficients of other predictors were consequently interpreted as averaged within-month associations based on the assumption that effects of other predictors do not vary over time. Population-attributable risk proportions 28 were calculated to identify the proportion of observed SAs that would not have occurred if the effects attributable to unit SAs were reduced to a reference level, assuming that coefficients in the model represent causal effects of the predictors.
Results
Of the 9512 enlisted suicide attempters and 151 526 control person-months, most were male (86.4%), 29 years or younger (68.4%), younger than 21 years when entering the army (62.2%), white (59.8%), high school educated (76.6%), and currently married (54.8%). Almost three-quarters (72.2%) had more than 2 years of service, 40.3% had never deployed, and 76.7% were assigned to an occupation other than combat arms (eTable 4 in the Supplement).
In univariate analyses, soldiers were more likely to attempt suicide if assigned to a unit with 1 or more past-year SAs (χ 2 5 = 1534.6, P < .001) ( Table 1) , with odds increasing monotonically as the number of unit SAs increased from 1 (OR, 1.6; 95% CI, 1.5-1.7) to 5 or more (OR, 3.9; 95% CI, 3.6-4.3). This association remained significant after adjusting for sociodemographic variables, age at army entry, time in service, deployment status, occupation, and unit size (χ 2 5 =543.9,P < .001), with soldiers being twice as likely to attempt suicide if there were 5 or more past-year unit attempts than if there were no attempts (OR, 2.3; 95% CI, 2.1-2.6). Of importance, the results were unchanged when (1) examining the number of past-year unit attempters (not attempts) as the predictor, (2) excluding soldiers in their first 6 months of service (a period of initial army training associated with particularly high risk of SA 3 ), (3) excluding soldiers in Warrior Transition Units (intensive rehabilitative care units for soldiers with significant physical and/or mental health needs), and (4) adjusting for the number of soldiers within a unit who had a past-year mental health diagnosis (an indicator of unit-based differences in distress). Results were also replicated in a generalized linear mixed-effects model and a generalized estimating equation model to account for any potential nonindependence (detailed results available on request).
The SREs of SA increased from 319 per 100 000 personyears for soldiers in a unit with no past-year SAs to 747 per 100 000 person-years for soldiers in a unit with 5 or more SAs. The population-attributable risk proportion for at least 1 unit SA in the past year (ie, the proportion of observed SAs associated with the predictor) based on this model was 18.2%, indicating that, if the risk associated with units that had at least 1 past-year SA could be reduced to those with no attempts, 18.2% of attempts would not occur. The population-attributable risk proportion for units with a history of 5 or more SAs revealed that 4.1% of subsequent SAs could be eliminated if risk was reduced to that of units in which there were 4 SAs or fewer.
We further examined the robustness of unit SAs by adding prior mental health diagnosis and past-year unit deaths due to suicide, combat, and unintentional injury to the model. The SA was related to prior mental health diagnosis (χ 2 1 = 7169.7, P < .001) but not to past-year unit deaths due to suicide (χ 2 1 = 1.4, P = .23), combat (χ 2 6 =1.3,P = .97), or unintentional injury (χ 2 2 =0.3,P = .87). Of importance, the association of pastyear unit SAs with soldiers' risk of SA remained significant after inclusion of these factors (χ 2 5 = 505.5, P < .001) (eTable 5 in the Supplement).
To identify whether the association of unit SA with risk of SA was modified by occupation and unit size, we included their 2-way interactions in separate multivariable models, adjusting for sociodemographic and service-related variables. The interactions of unit SAs with occupation (χ 2 5 = 13.2, P = .02) and unit size (χ 2 15 =87 . 6 ,P < .001) were significant; the 3-way interaction was not (χ 2 15 =16.2,P = .37). To better understand these 2-way interactions, we examined models stratified first by occupation and then, separately, by unit size. Among combat arms (χ 2 5 = 119.3, P < .001) and other occupation groups (χ 2 5 = 409.4, P < .001), the number of past-year unit SAs was significantly associated with risk of SA ( Table 2 ). The odds of SA increased as the number of unit SAs increased in both groups (ORs, 1.4-2.3). Figure 1 shows the standardized risk of SA by occupation. Risk of SA in both occupation groups generally increased as a function of past-year unit SAs. Among soldiers in a unit with 5 or more past-year SAs, the standardized risk for those with a combat arms occupation was significantly higher than for those with other occupations (rate ratio [RR], 1.2; 95% CI, 1.1-1.2).
After stratifying by unit size, past-year unit SAs were consistently associated with higher odds of SA for each unit size group (Table 3) . This association was particularly strong for smaller units of 1 through 40 soldiers (ORs, 2.1-5.9) compared with units of 41 through 100 (ORs, 1.4-2.2), 101 through 200 (ORs, 1.3-2.0), and 201 through 600 soldiers (ORs, 1.3-2.4). Figure 2 indicates that the SREs generally increased as a function of past-year unit SAs, with risk increasing most substantially for those in smaller units. Among soldiers in a unit with 5 or more past-year SAs, the SRE for those in a unit of 1 through 40 soldiers was significantly higher than the SREs for those in a unit of 41 through 100 (RR, 2.3; 95% CI, 2.2-2.4), 101 through 200 (RR, 2.8; 95% CI, 2.7-2.9), and 201 through 600 soldiers (RR, 2.8; 95% CI, 2.7-2.9). Among units in which there were at least 4 past-year SAs, soldiers in units of 1 through 40 were at least twice as likely to attempt suicide as those in larger units (ie, 41-600 troops; RRs, 2.3-3.6; 95% CI, 2.2-3.7; P < .001).
Discussion
Suicide attempts within an army unit are significant stressors. We found that a soldier's risk of attempting suicide increased as the number of past-year unit SAs increased, a robust association that persisted even after adjusting for sociodemographic and service-related variables, unit size, previous mental health diagnosis, and past-year deaths due to suicide, combat, and unintentional injury. The association also persisted when examining number of past-year unit suicide attempters (instead of attempts) as the predictor, excluding soldiers in their first 6 months of service, excluding soldiers in Warrior Transition Units, and when adjusting for the number of soldiers within a soldier's unit with a past-year mental health diagnosis. Previous research has primarily focused on soldiers' responses to suicide death, with less attention to responses after unit SAs. It is estimated that for every suicide, many people are profoundly affected. 
Combat arms MOS
The SREs (number of soldiers who attempted suicide per 100 000 person-years) were calculated assuming other predictors were at their sample-wide means. The SREs were calculated separately for each MOS based on logistic regression models that included basic sociodemographic and service-related variables (sex, age at entry into the army, current age, race/ethnicity, educational level, marital status, time in service, deployment status, unit size, and number of past-year unit suicide attempts) and included a dummy predictor variable for calendar month and year to control for secular trends. The SREs (number of soldiers who attempted suicide per 100 000 person-years) were calculated assuming other predictors were at their sample-wide means. The SREs were calculated separately for each unit size based on logistic regression models that included basic sociodemographic and service-related variables (sex, age at entry into the army, current age, race/ethnicity, educational level, marital status, time in service, deployment status, military occupation, and number of past-year unit suicide attempts) and included a dummy predictor variable for calendar month and year to control for secular trends. importance of this risk factor among servicemembers. Contrary to previous findings, which relate generally to knowing someone who had died by suicide, unit deaths of any type, including suicide, were not significantly associated with risk of SA in our study. Unit deaths are a more specific and circumscribed group than knowing someone, and the causal mechanisms and responses (eg, of peers and leaders) may differ for unit suicide deaths vs attempts in an activeduty army unit. In addition, there is a lower frequency of unit deaths relative to unit SAs, which may make it harder to detect the influence of deaths in our sample. Intervention efforts that track unit SAs regardless of whether unit members were acquainted with the attempter may help identify at-risk groups. We found that past-year unit SAs were associated with risk of SA regardless of occupation or unit size. Among combat arms and other occupations, risk of SA was twice as likely among those in units with at least 5 past-year SAs vs units with none. Risk was generally higher for soldiers in smaller vs larger units, regardless of the number of past-year unit SAs. Among soldiers assigned to smaller units (1-40 soldiers) , the association of past-year unit SAs with subsequent risk of SA was particularly pronounced.
Unit characteristics that persist over time, including leadership quality, extent of social support and cohesion, and presence of bullying, may influence unit culture and affect the likelihood of and responses to unit SAs. Such characteristics may be more influential in smaller units. For example, unit cohesion has been associated with reduced distress, increased resilience, and positive states of mind.
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To the extent that SAs among fellow soldiers disrupt a soldier's sense of unit cohesion, our findings suggest that the negative effects may be strongest in smaller units. Similarly, the potential for contagion, particularly within smaller units, is worthy of further study.
Limitations
The current study has several limitations. First, the SA data were from administrative and medical records and are therefore recognized SAs, although they perhaps include the most severe accounts. These records may be subject to diagnostic or coding errors. Second, these data focus exclusively on the 2004 through 2009 period, and findings may not generalize to earlier and later periods of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars or to other US military conflicts. Third, this study did not examine mechanisms of risk. Given the manner in which units were constructed for analysis, unit members may not have been located in the same geographic area or had direct contact with those who attempted suicide. It is important for future studies to explore potential mediators. Fourth, although we examined a range of individual and unit-level covariates, there may be additional important indicators to consider. For example, future studies should examine whether the association of previous unit SAs with subsequent SA risk is modified by other unit variables, including leadership quality and cohesion. Studies should also examine whether the recency of previous unit SAs affects subsequent risk. .20, .21, .22, .23, .24, .25, .26, .3, .30, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36 Bipolar Disorder 296.00, .01, .02, .03, .04, .05, .06, .10, .11, .12, .13, .14, .15, .16, .40, .41, .42, .43, .44, .45, .46, .50, .51, .52, .53, .54, .55, .56, .60, .61, .62, .63, .64, .65, .66, .7, .80, .81 1, .2, .8, .9 315.00, .01, .02, .09, .1, .2, .3, .31, .32, .34, .39, .4, .5, .8, .9 Conduct Disorder/ Oppositional Defiant Disorder 301.7 312.4, .8, .81, .82, .89, .9 313.81
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eAppendix. Supplemental Methods
Identification of units for analysis
The Unit Identification Code (UIC) of each Soldier in a given month was used to group the person-month records in the study sample. The UICs for duty units were used in this analysis. The UIC is a 6-digit alpha-numeric code. Due to the sensitive nature of Army units, the UIC was encrypted to become a 10-digit alpha-numeric code. Missing UICs values were imputed by carrying available information forward or backward over a Soldier's career.
